The History of Palestine

Palestine: An Overview to 1914

The land of Palestine consists of four natural regions with Jerusalem at its heart.  In the south of the country is the sparsely populated Negev desert, the traditional home and transit route of the Bedouin.  The coastal plain stretching from Rafah in the south to the Lebanese border in the north encompassed the great maritime cities of Palestine – Gaza, Jaffa, Haifa and Acre- and is now the location of many of Israel’s most populous cities.  The northern region of Galilee with its breathtaking hills and valleys has always been the most fertile region of Palestine and the present day communities are still agriculturally based.  The centre-east of Palestine is dominated by the barren and hilly deserts of Jebel Al-Samara and Jebel Al-Wusta, the religious heartland of the country and more commonly referred to as the West Bank.

Palestine is the home of the three great monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and is commonly referred to as the ‘Holy Land’.  It is a land that is situated at the crossroads of three continents and has been an integral part of various empires over history.

The Canaanites, Philistines, Hebrews, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians and Macedonians all ruled Palestine for various lengths of time until the birth of Jesus Christ during the era of the Roman Empire.  The Byzantine Empire replaced the Romans and transformed Jerusalem into a Christian city.  With the exception of a brief period under the Persian Sassanid dynasty, the Byzantines ruled until 638AD when Arab armies conquered the territory and introduced Islam.

For the next 460 years the country remained under Muslim rule until 1099AD when the Crusaders took control.  The Crusader Kingdom lasted until 1187AD when Saladin recaptured Jerusalem for Islam.  Apart from another brief period of Christian governance (1229AD-1244AD) Jerusalem and Palestine remained under Muslim rule, most notably by the Mamluk dynasty from 1250AD onwards.  The Turkish Ottoman dynasty conquered Palestine in 1516AD and then ruled almost continuously until the end of the First World War.

The Zionist Claim to Palestine

A definition of Zionism:

“A political movement for the establishment and support of a national homeland for Jews in Palestine.”

Europe witnessed a rise in anti-semitism towards the end of the nineteenth century, motivated by new scientific ideas about 'race' and the inherent superiority of white, caucasian peoples.  It was further aggravated by the migration of some four million Russian Jews across Europe and compounded by Jewish speculators being blamed for the great depression of the 1880’s.  An incident that encapsulated this ‘new anti-semitism’ was the Dreyfus Affair that took place in the early 1890’s.

The Dreyfus Affair was the trial of a Jew serving in the French army and accused, falsely, of treason.  Theodor Herzl, a Hungarian born Jew credited with being the father of political Zionism and the visionary of the Jewish state, was a journalist covering the trail for a Vienna based newspaper.  Although an assimilated Jew with no particular interest in Jewish affairs the trial, in the context of the growing anti-semitism, aroused his interest and he concluded that the answer to the perennial  ‘Jewish problem’ was a Jewish Nation.  This concept, coupled with the prevailing notions of nationalism and colonialism, led him to write “Der Judenstaat” (the Jewish State) in 1896.  The book provided a detailed blue print for a Jewish state and it is widely accepted that the publication marked the beginning of … political Zionism.

The following year, 1897, Theodor Herzl convened the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland, where the World Zionist Organisation was set up with the declared aim of creating for the Jewish people 'a home in Palestine secured by public law'.

Palestine was chosen because of its historical links with Judaism. There had long been a Jewish community in Palestine that had enjoyed a short period as an independent kingdom under David and Saul and longer periods of autonomy under a range of other rulers before their final dispersal from the Holy Land in 135 AD following a revolt against Roman rule.   The  belief that the land was promised by God to their patriarch Abraham as ‘the Jewish inheritance’ was the other crucial factor.  However, the Basle declaration failed to acknowledge that the land was now owned and settled by a completely different people, the Christian and Muslim Palestinian Arabs.    In fact after the Basel Congress, two Rabbis from Vienna, sent to Palestine to explore Herzl’s proposals reported back that “ the bride is beautiful, but she is married to another man”.

At first, Political Zionism made very slow progress and failed to gather either widespread Jewish support or the diplomatic support of the Great Powers.  Many settlers who travelled to Palestine found the conditions overly harsh and choose to return to their home countries.  By 1914 the Jewish population of Palestine was only a little over ten per cent of the total population and less than half of these were Zionists.

In 1917 two significant events took place that changed the face of Zionism and reinvigorated the Zionist adventure.  The first was the British defeat of Ottoman forces and their subsequent occupation of Palestine.  The second was the emergence in Britain of a remarkable political leader, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, as a dominant force in British Zionism.  Dr. Weiszmann had developed contacts among many influential Britons and had persuaded them to support the Zionist aims.  With Great Britain now governing Palestine, he found himself negotiating with the British government for official endorsement of Zionist hopes.  The result of these negotiations was the Balfour Declaration of 2nd November 1917.

The Balfour Declaration was contained in a letter by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour to a prominent Zionist, Lord Rothschild.  In this letter, Lord Balfour promised to help establish “ a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine”.

Although this declaration was virtually meaningless and committed Britain to nothing it gave the Zionist movement the diplomatic recognition it craved so dearly and the momentum to continue.

The British Mandate Period

In order to understand how the Palestinian Arabs, who constituted ninety per cent of the population in 1917, found themselves stateless by 1949 one must analyse the role of the three main protagonists during the course of the mandate; the British, the Zionists and the Palestinian Arabs themselves.

The British

In the San Remo Conference of April 1920, Great Britain was assigned the mandate for Palestine.  This was ratified two years later by the League of Nations and included, due to strong Zionist pressure, the Balfour Declaration in its preamble, thus elevating it to the status of international law.  The first partition of Palestine also took place at this time with eastern Palestine separated and governed as a separate administration of Transjordan.

Britain’s strategic interest in Palestine was tied to protecting the region surrounding the Suez Canal and countering French influence.  Palestine was considered a backwater of the British Empire and thus the quality of many of the officials posted there was somewhat lacking.  Although a surprising number were pro-Arab, their general attitudes were patronising and condescending and they showed little understanding of Arab customs and the depth of their hostility towards the Zionist project. 

Many of the British officials were also Jewish, some of who were committed Zionists, and this inevitably placed the Palestinian Arabs at a disadvantage.  There were also many Christian British officials influenced by the Old Testament and sympathetic to the Zionist cause.  The reality was that, whatever their persuasion, they were bound by the mandatory regulations to continually consult with and assist the Zionist authorities in the formation of the 'Jewish Homeland'.

The Zionists

The Zionists were ideologically committed, well organised, funded and co-ordinated.  They had a high quality leadership and were well versed in the ways of western diplomacy and politics.  Zionist intelligence gathering was also far superior to the rudimentary Arab effort.  Zionist officials had access to nearly all the secret documents that were formulated both in Jerusalem and in the Colonial Office in London, either through their own spies or through British officials sympathetic to their cause.  They also wielded huge influence on the British government through their supporters in England, ensuring Zionist interests would be served in formulating British policy to Palestine.

Jews were allowed to serve in the Palestine gendarmerie and many used their positions to steal arms and transfer them to the Jewish Underground.  Jewish custom officials also facilitated arms smuggling and therefore the Jewish community became fairly well armed, especially when compared with the Palestinian Arabs who had few weapons.

The Palestinian Arabs

The structure of Palestinian society was very factionalised with loyalties primarily based along the lines of the hamula, the extended family.  The heads of the largest families, known as notables, controlled Palestinian politics.  This meant that although most Palestinian notables were nationalistic in outlook, the Palestinian cause was often sidelined by inter-family rivalries and their pre-occupations with their own self-interests.  Only Islam had the power to cross class identification and family loyalties but that, in turn, had the effect of widening the gap between Christian and Muslim Palestinians.

The notables were also unused to western style diplomacy and politics leaving them at a huge disadvantage when dealing with the mandatory authorities.  This was amplified by their lack of permanent representation in London until 1937, leaving them without a counter balance to the strong Zionist influence on the British government.

The most influential figure in Palestinian politics in this era was Hajj Amin Al-Husseini who was appointed to the two powerful posts of Mufti and President of the Supreme Muslim Council.  Although cunning and manipulative, Hajj Amin was lacking in statesmanship and foresight and played a major role in maintaining the divisions between the different notable families.  This greatly hindered the development of a unified Palestinian Arab response to the British and the Zionists.  Arguably Hajj Amin’s greatest failure was his choice of ally during the Second World War.  Believing that Germany would win and would offer better terms for independence, he sided with them.  This resulted in his exile, leaving his people leaderless just when the threat was at its greatest.

The Mandate

British policy during the mandate tended to vacillate according to which groups pushed most.  In 1922 following a wave of Arab riots, the British authority issued a White Paper that, whilst reaffirming the Balfour Declaration, sought to limit Jewish immigration to the economic absorptive capacity of the country.  This was a vague and meaningless statement but was nevertheless followed by a period of relative calm and prosperity during which a  potential opportunity to solve the problem was missed.  Between 1925-28,  with Jewish emigration outnumbering immigration, they could have sought a revision of the mandate claiming, rightly, that the Zionist project was failing.  Instead the British choose to concentrate on the economy and municipal level self-government, thus further alienating the Arab moderates who were at the fore during this period.

The calm was shattered in 1929 by a dispute at the Western (Wailing) Wall that led to large-scale riots in Jerusalem that later spread to Safed, Hebron and Jaffa.  What started as a long-standing but purely religious dispute evolved into a political confrontation, thereby fusing religion with politics in Palestine for the first time.

The British responded by sending an investigative committee, which initiated a further study on land and immigration issues.  The result of these studies was the publication of the Passfield White Paper that called for a halt to Jewish immigration and for the sale of government land to landless Arabs.  The Zionist outcry was overwhelming, and the following year the British Prime Minister, Ramsey MacDonald, issued an explanatory letter effectively nullifying the provisions of the Passfield White Paper.  The Palestinian Arabs referred to this statement as the Black Letter and it served to radicalise them against the British authorities

The early 1930’s were characterised by a rapid increase in Jewish immigration and land purchases.  The rise to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany and government sponsored anti-semitism in Poland, Hungary and Romania led to a massive influx of immigrants from those countries and by 1936 the Jewish population made up approximately thirty per cent of the total population.  Arab land sales to Jews had also increased substantially in this period due to differing reasons.  Many of the large Palestinian landowners during the Ottoman times where based in Lebanon and Syria and these absentee landowners had become alienated from their land.  They choose to sell their holdings to the Jewish Agency who, in turn, expelled the Arab peasants who had been tilling the land.  The deteriorating economic conditions also forced smaller landholders to sell and move to the cities.  This created a class of ‘rural’ refugees, unemployed and bitter towards both the British and the Zionists who they considered had stolen their land.  When the British, again succumbing to Zionist pressure, backed down on plans for constitutional development the growing anger of the Palestinian population exploded in what would later be called the 'Great Arab Rebellion' which lasted for three years.

The revolt mobilised thousands of Palestinian Arabs from every stratum of society and helped to instil a greater sense of Palestinian nationalism than the bickering notables had ever managed. The revolt also provoked an unprecedented counter mobilisation by the British and the Zionists.  The British poured thousands of troops into Palestine in an effort to quash the uprising and also allowed the Zionists to arm themselves, a decision they would later regret.  

In 1937, with the situation in Palestine still volatile, a Royal commission, headed by Lord Robert Peel, was sent to investigate.  The Peel Commission Report was the first to recommend the partition of Palestine.  It proposed a small Jewish state in the north of the country and an Arab state in the south and east that would be merged with Transjordan.  Britain would keep control of a central stretch from Jerusalem to Jaffa.  Although the Zionists reluctantly accepted the proposal, the Palestinian Arabs rejected it outright claiming that all of Palestine belonged to them.  Realising that an agreement suitable to both sides was impossible, and not wishing to alienate the Arab States or their Muslim co-religionists in India on the eve of the Second World War, the Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, issued a new White Paper on Palestine in May 1939.  This declared that Palestine would become an independent state allied to the British Empire within ten years.  Jewish immigration and land purchases would be further restricted and would become dependant on Arab consent.  This effectively ended the Great Arab Revolt, although the Arab ‘victory’ was at a great cost.  Most of its leadership was now in exile and its population disarmed.

The Zionists were enraged by the 1939 White Paper and its effective repudiation of the Balfour Declaration.  There were now 15,000 Jews under arms and many had received invaluable training from the British army during the Great Arab Revolt, both officially and unofficially.  The response of the Zionists in Palestine came in two forms during the Second World War.  The Labour Zionists in the Haganah, the Jewish defence force, fought with the Allies and gained further arms, experience and British gratitude.  The Revisionist Zionists choose to fight the British, forming two paramilitary forces, the Stern Gang and the Irgun, and embarking on a campaign of terrorism.

At the same time Jews in the US, previously uninterested in the Zionist project were becoming increasingly involved due to the growing rumours about the ‘final solution’.  In 1942 a Zionist conference in New York issued the 'Biltmore Declaration' calling for a 'Jewish Commonwealth' in Palestine.  This marked the start of a campaign of political pressure on the US government to intervene that would eventually bear fruit post war.

Post-war to Partition

Post-war Palestine witnessed a steep rise in Jewish terrorism against the British authorities.  What had begun with the assassination of Lord Moyne, the resident British Ambassador to the Middle East, in Cairo in November 1944 had mushroomed into a highly organised and effective campaign.  David Ben-Gurion had replaced Chaim Weiszmann as the Zionist leader shortly after the 1942 Biltmore Conference.  Whereas Weiszmann had pursued a policy of gradual diplomacy, Ben-Gurion advocated achieving immediate statehood by the use of force if necessary.  The Jewish community in Palestine, shocked and outraged by the Holocaust, merged into a cohesive and determined national community and took up arms against the British.

The British, greatly weakened by the war and struggling to meet the cost of maintaining a military presence not only in Palestine but other colonies, struggled to contain the escalating Zionist terrorism.  Probably the most psychologically damaging attack was the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem by the Irgun, led by a future Prime Minister of Israel – Menachem Begin.  This building served as the main British military and civilian headquarters and approximately ninety people were killed in the attack.  The fact that Zionist terrorists had managed to infiltrate the heart of the British military establishment and its most heavily fortified building was considered a dramatic humiliation.

The British had another immediate post war concern.  The war had displaced approximately seven million people of which about 100,000 were Jewish.  The Jewish Agency and other Zionist organisations were pressing the British to settle them in Palestine.  The US was bearing the main responsibility for the displaced persons and they too were pressurising the British to allow them into Palestine. However  both governments needed to keep Arab states pacified in order to stop Soviet penetration of the region so a joint investigative team was sent to question both sides, with the two governments promising to support a unanimous report.  The Joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry recommended that the Jews be admitted immediately and that a bi-national state be set up under UN trusteeship.  The US under Truman accepted the refugee element but was reluctant to offer financial help and later in the year Truman publicly indicated his preference was for partition.  The British under Bevin flatly rejected both proposals.

During this period the Palestinian Arabs, exhausted after their own revolt and with their leaders in exile, had at first trusted the British to deliver on their promise of independence under the terms of the 1939 White Paper.  When it became apparent that their trust had been misplaced they then believed that in the event of war the neighbouring Arab armies would come to their rescue and return to them what they believed was rightfully theirs.  The Zionists carefully and patiently planned for the war they knew was inevitable.

Facing enormous pressures at home, rising anarchy in Palestine and considerable friction with the US government, the British decided that they could not find a settlement.  On February 14th 1947, the British government passed the problem to the newly formed United Nations without recommending any preferred solution.

The Partition of Palestine

After taking control of the problem of Palestine, the UN responded by sending their own committee of inquiry, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), to investigate the situation.  The Zionists co-operated, indicating they would accept some form of partition, while the Palestinian Arabs refused arguing that their rights were self-evident.  The committee agreed on a need to end the Mandate with a majority favouring a two state solution with Jerusalem under international control.  Although Britain remained neutral on the issue, both the US and USSR supported partition for various reasons.  US support is attributed mainly to internal Zionist pressure and the view that a western, Jewish state would be a bastion of democracy in the region.  The USSR believed that the socialist orientation of many of the Zionist leaders would offer it an opportunity to enter the region and that it would also signal the end of British influence in the region.  The Zionists agreed, albeit reluctantly, as it offered them a sovereign state and a right to immigration.

To the Palestinian Arabs the partition plan was inherently unfair and they rejected it.  Not only did it give newly arrived Jews equal rights to the long term Arab residents, but the partition arrangement was completely unjust.  The Jews formed only one third of the population and owned less than eight per cent of the land but were being offered 57 per cent of Palestine including the majority of the most fertile land.  The Palestinian Arabs would lose their commercial capital, Jaffa, with its (no apostrophe) overwhelming Arab population as well as the strategic and historic port of Haifa.  To complete the insult there was almost as many Palestinian Arabs in the Jewish area as Jews.

On the 29th November 1947 the UN adopted the partition plan by a majority of 33:13 with 10 abstentions. Palestine descended into chaos.  In the aftermath of the vote the Palestinian Arabs, aided by irregular soldiers from surrounding Arab states gained the upper hand.  However, the Hagannah received huge supplies of arms from Czechoslovakia and by early May 1948 the Jews controlled roughly the area allocated to them in the partition plan.  The British appeared to have lost control of the situation.

The First Arab-Israeli War 1948-9

On May 14th 1948 the British withdrew from Palestine and the state of Israel was declared.  The following morning armies from Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq entered the areas designated for the Palestinian Arab State.  While at first Israel was very much on the defensive, a month long ceasefire in June enabled them to rearm, after which they gradually gained the ascendancy, ending the war in control of some 78 per cent of Palestine.  The Palestinian Arabs had lost not only Palestine but also their opportunity for a state, with Jordan annexing what is now the West Bank and Egypt in control of the Gaza Strip.

Israel had not only won its independence and a vastly increased territory, it had also rid the territory it controlled of a substantial proportion of its inhabitants.  While some Arabs voluntarily fled to avoid war the vast majority fled in response to fear, intimidation and attack.  The Irgun and Stern Gang carried out massacres that encouraged vulnerable communities to flee.. Plan Dalat - a blueprint for what is now termed 'ethnic cleansing' identified those Arab communities in strategic areas that needed to be cleared and here the Hagannah intimidated the inhabitants into leaving.  Over 700,00 Palestinian Arabs became refugees and although UN General Assembly Resolution 194 called for their return, they have never been allowed back.   Once they had fled, the newly formed Israeli government distributed abandoned townhouses to new Jewish immigrants and systematically razed Palestinian Arab villages.  For the Palestinian Arabs this period became known as al-Nakba, the Catastrophe.

The Wilderness Years 1949-67

During this period the Middle East became a chessboard for Cold War politics with Palestinian rights being forgotten.  Israel ignored UN Resolution 194 and the UN itself failed to enforce it.  The general attitude of Western governments seemed to be that neighbouring Arab states should resettle them- a wilful and racist ignorance of their obligations as members of the United Nations.

Israel had been recognised by the majority of UN member states and rapidly undertook a process of nation building.  Jewish immigrants poured in from European and Middle Eastern countries.  Money and arms came from the Allied powers although Israel always maintained the freedom of unilateral action.

The Palestinian cause was further undermined by the newly formed Arab League taking over the leadership of the fight against the Zionists.  Most Arab states had only recently gained independence themselves and were constantly vulnerable to internal coups.  The surrounding Arab states had different agendas vis-à-vis Palestine.  Egypt and Syria were fighting for control over the ‘Pan-Arab Nation’ and used the issue of Palestine as a rhetorical battlefield.  Meanwhile Jordan was keen to expand its own territory and hold onto Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank that it had won in the 1948 war.  Each of the surrounding Arab countries sponsored a different Palestinian ‘leader’ and thus the divisions that existed during the Mandate continued under the changed circumstances of the Palestinians.

Whist the Palestinian Arabs were happy to allow the Arab League to fight for them on the political level, they carried on a low intensity guerrilla fight against the new Zionist State. Israel responded with a policy of severe retaliation to each act of hostility against the nation territory from where the operation was launched.  Although most Israeli reprisals were disproportionate, the destruction of the village of Qibya in 1953 was particularly noteworthy.  An Israeli army unit, led by Ariel Sharon – another future Prime Minister, crossed into Jordan and killed 69 unarmed civilians whilst blowing up the entire village.  As a result of attacks like this, the host Arab countries began to curtail the activities of the fedayeen, the Palestinian guerrilla fighters.

An early indication of Israel’s expansionist inclinations was the 1956 Suez War.  Israel utilised the anger of Britain and France at the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Nasser to encourage an attack on Egypt.  Eisenhower, standing for re-election on a platform for ‘peace’ stepped in and eventually forced a withdrawal but not before Israel had benefited greatly.  Most of Egypt’s new Russian weaponry had been destroyed, the US embarked on a policy of isolating Egypt, France flooded Israel with new weapons and a UN observer force was posted on the Egypt-Israel border (securing peace in the south from both Egypt and Palestinian fedayeen attack).  Arguably the greatest gain for Israel was the re-opening of the Straits of Tiran and the declaration that any future closure would be a cause for war – paving the way for the next major Arab-Israeli War in 1967.

Total Occupation 1967-1987

The June War

The causes of the 1967 war are still subject to debate but most agree that the main instigator was Nasser.   He saw himself as the natural leader of the Pan –Arab movement that sought a unified Arab nation incorporating Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

Engaging in brinkmanship in response to challenges to his leadership, he demanded the UNEF forces withdraw from Sinai, he then mobilised his troops along the border with Israel and crucially, closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.

The Soviets also bear some responsibility for the war having provided, for reasons never explained, false intelligence to Egypt that the Israeli army was massing on the Syrian border, intending to invade and topple the regime.   There were also some in the Israeli government who wanted a war with Egypt for expansionist and also strategic reasons with Egypt perceived as providing the most credible military threat to Israel.

Whatever the causes the result was catastrophic for the Arab world as a whole and the Palestinians in particular.

On June 5th 1967 Israel attacked Egypt and began the second Arab-Israeli war.  After destroying the Egyptian air force on the ground, Israel succeeded in gaining a total victory with huge territorial gains.  Jordan and Syria had weighed in on the Egyptian side but within only six days Israel had conquered the Gaza Strip and Sinai from Egypt, Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria.  Although the Arab states had quantitative advantage in terms of personnel, Israel with its offensive capability and advanced weapons technology had a definite qualitative edge. 

For the Palestinians the war was a second catastrophe.  Over 100,000 new refugees were created as inhabitants of the West Bank poured over the Jordan River, their homes being bulldozed behind them by the Israelis to discourage them from returning.  Perhaps the most important effect of the Arab failure on the Palestinians was to bring home the realization that if Palestine was ever to be liberated it would have to be by their own efforts. 

Following the June war Israel offered peace talks without preconditions.  This allowed them to appear conciliatory without having to define their position.  The United Nations passed resolution 242 which called on Israel to ‘withdraw from territories’ occupied during the war.   However the failure to insert the word 'the' allowed Israel to challenge the degree of withdrawal any peace proposal would entail.  The resolution also failed to mention any Palestinian right to self-determination.

Israelis were possessed by a new sense of invincibility and confidence, feeling no need to respond to international pressure regarding the fate of the refugees or the Occupied Territories.  Within weeks of the occupation illegal settlements, set up by religious and political groups adhering to the ideology of a ‘greater Israel’ and with open assistance from some of the military commanders in the areas, began to appear in the Occupied Territories.  Suppression of Palestinian identity was of paramount importance with the Palestinian flag banned, rigorous censorship of books, plays and newspapers and control exerted over the school curriculum.  Efforts were also exerted to develop a pro-Israeli leadership.

Yom Kippur War 1973

The Israeli sense of invincibility was shattered by the Yom Kippur War.  Due to a combination of complacency in terms of its own undoubted military superiority and a failure by intelligence which put down an Egyptian military build-up as normal manoeuvres, an attack by Egypt and Syria took Israel by surprise on Yom Kippur 1973.  Israel came close to defeat, saved only by a huge US airlift of replacement equipment and by divisions over tactics betweens the Syrians and the Egyptians.  The war also marked the introduction of the use of oil as a weapon by the Arab states. 

The Emergence of the PLO

The misery, squalor and humiliation of life in the refugee camps provided a disgruntled mass, receptive to revolutionary rhetoric and after the 1967 war thousands responded to the call for Palestinian action, both politically and militarily.  The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) had been set up in1964 by Nasser as a ‘talking shop’ to maintain control over Palestinian political activities.  It was not until Yasser Arafat took control of the organisation in 1969 that it became a potent symbol of Palestinian nationalism and hopes.

Yasser Arafat had formed al-Fatah in 1959 with an anti-colonialist and anti-communist orientation.  Although essentially non-ideological, the most accurate definition of al-Fatah was ‘pragmatic nationalists’.  Their central belief was that Palestinian military action would lead to Israeli threats, which in turn would stimulate Arab unity to confront them.  Pressure on the international community by the Arab states and ultimately Arab states action against Israel would lead to the liberation of Palestine.

Realising that the Palestinian cause had been subordinated by the elusive goal of pan-Arab unity, Arafat and al-Fatah took over the PLO and began transforming it into a government in exile.  The two other major Palestinian factions were invited to join, the Marxist-Leninist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). 

The PLO suffered its first major setback in September 1970.  At the time Arafat and most of his key allies were based in the refugee camps of Jordan, a country where the majority of the population is of Palestinian origin.  The PLO had formed a state within a state and had been launching cross border raids into Israel.  The Israelis, in turn, attacked Jordanian installations in retaliation.  The attacks, in a context where Hussein felt threatened by left wing PLO factions who were calling for his overthrow, and under pressure from the international community to deal with terrorism originating in his kingdom, led to civil war in September 1970.

The fighting lasted for a month with thousands of Palestinians killed.  The PLO had no answer to the military superiority of a national army and was defeated.  The events became known as Black September and Arafat and the PLO were exiled, mainly to Lebanon.

The Palestinians

The 1973 war led to an evaluation of strategy by al - Fatah with a new emphasis on diplomacy advocated.  It was at this point that Arafat began the long process of convincing the various factions of the PLO that Israel could never be defeated and that a ‘two state solution’ was a more realistic objective.  The democratic nature of the PLO and the strong support within it for the rejectionist front meant that Arafat could not abandon the military option. This unfortunately allowed the Israelis to convince the Americans to continue to exclude the PLO from any negotiations on the grounds that it was a purely 'terrorist' organisation.

However the diplomatic strategy soon began to make significant gains in the international arena.  On October 28th 1974 at the Arab League summit in Rabat the PLO was recognised as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.  The following month Arafat, as the PLO Chairman, was invited to address the UN General Assembly.  He was the first representative of a non-state to do so and after setting out the PLO position calling for a democratic, secular state in Palestine he concluded; “I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun.  Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand”.  In December 1975 the UN Security Council allowed the PLO to observe a debate on the Arab- Israeli question.

The military actions and the diplomatic gains had by now successfully brought the Palestinian cause into the international arena engendering a new pride and hope amongst Palestinians.  The West Bank Palestinians, quiescent during the early years of the Occupation, were becoming more restive and, inspired by the successes of the PLO, began to organise to resist the occupation.  A wave of unrest during 1975-76 was followed by the election of pro -PLO mayors in the municipal elections held in 1976.  A major Israeli crackdown ensued and the mayors were eventually either sacked or deported but by this time the myth of the ‘benevolent occupation’ had been totally undermined.  (I think here you should briefly go into the nature of the occupation in terms of denial of human rights, demolition of housing, detention without trial etc.  also the water issue and the amount of land confiscated.  You need to have set out how much land was under control by 1987 so that oslo makes sense in terms of what being returned etc).

The Israelis

Amongst the Israelis there was no consensus about the occupation.  Initially a divisive debate had taken place between cross party proponents of returning the Territories for peace and those calling for annexation, which resulted in a paralysis of decision-making.  However, the illegal annexation of Arab East Jerusalem in the immediate aftermath of the June War and the proliferation of Jewish across the Occupied Territories completely undermined any pretence of a ‘land for peace’ policy. 

Although the US supported the Israeli position of not recognising the PLO and refusing to talk with them, President Carter, in a break with this tradition, endorsed a Palestinian ‘homeland’ in an address in Massachusetts.  Whilst the Palestinians hoped that this would be their  ‘Balfour Declaration’, it was to prove a false dawn with Carter later forced to backtrack on his comments.  In July 1977 he stated that any Palestinian ‘entity’ should be tied in with Jordan and not be ‘independent’.  He then dropped the Palestinian issue to concentrate on securing an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.  To add to Palestinian dismay Menachem Begin, the former Irgun commander, was elected as Israeli Prime Minister in May 1977.

This was to prove as much a landmark for the Palestinians as for the Israelis.  Whereas the Israel Labour Party had kept up the pretence of the ‘land for peace’ solution, the election of Begin’s Likud Party meant that a right wing expansionist government was now in place, one that vowed never to relinquish the Occupied Territories.

Camp David Peace Accord

The signing of the Camp David peace accords on September 17th 1978 was an Egyptian betrayal not only of Palestinian interests but of the Arab cause in general.  It removed the most powerful Arab state from the conflict and left the Syrians, Jordanians and Palestinians to recover their territories from a dramatically weakened position.

Egypt secured an Israeli withdrawal from Occupied Sinai and a peace treaty between the countries.  Although the framework spoke loosely about Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza, it completely ignored the issue of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.  Arab reaction was far more harsh and swift than Egypt had anticipated.  Within months, Egypt had been suspended from the Arab League, expelled from the Islamic Conference and ousted from a number of Arab financial and economic institutions.  The PLO and all Arab countries, except Oman and Sudan, severed diplomatic relations with Egypt.

For Israel the Sinai did not hold the same ideological and national imperatives as the West Bank and Gaza did and was always negotiable.  Furthermore the removal of Egypt from the conflict not only meant that the possibility of military defeat was hugely diminished, it also enabled Israel to concentrate on securing peace on its northern border without fear of attack from the south.

1982 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon

Since their expulsion from Jordan the PLO had formed another mini-state within Lebanon.  The Palestinian fedayeen had nearly complete control over south Lebanon and regularly launched military operations from there into northern Israel.  The Israelis had their own plans for Lebanon.  They aimed to destroy the PLO presence there, to ensure a friendly Christian government would be installed and they also had designs on water sources near the border.   However in the summer of the US secured a cease-fire and, despite provocation by the Israelis the PLO had kept it.   An attempted assassination on the Israeli ambassador in London gave the Israeli government an excuse to invade.   This was despite the fact that Begin and Sharon knew the assassination was the work of the maverick group 'Abu Nidal' who was not part of the PLO.  The cabinet that approved the invasion were not informed of this intelligence.

The attack was launched on June 6th under the code name ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’.  The official explanation for the invasion was that Israel would eliminate the PLO in south Lebanon and create a secure area up to twenty-five miles north of its border.  However the Israeli army, under the direction of Defence Minister Ariel Sharon and without the knowledge of Begin, continued its advance and launched an assault on Beirut.  Using warplanes, gunships and heavy artillery Israel bombarded the city causing thousands of civilian casualties.  The PLO managed to withstand the Israeli siege for two months until a peace agreement allowed for their withdrawal.  On August 21st 1982 the PLO forces left Lebanon with their weapons and headed for another exile, this time primarily to Tunisia. 

Soon after the PLO evacuation a massacre took place in two Beirut refugee camps that brought the plight of the refugees to international attention.  On September 14th 1982, Bashir Gemayal, a Christian ally of Israel and Lebanon’s recently elected president was assassinated.  The Christians wrongly accused the Palestinians and sought revenge.  The Israeli army permitted the Christian militias to enter the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, both of which they controlled.  After the evacuation of the PLO fighters the camps were largely populated by women, children and the elderly but nevertheless the Christian militia embarked on a murderous rampage which lasted nearly three days and killed over two thousand Palestinians.  Not only had the Israeli army permitted the militias to enter, they lit up the night skies with flares to aid the ‘search’.

A huge international outcry followed the massacre and the Israelis set up an internal commission of inquiry under Supreme Court Justice Yitzhak Kahan.  The Kahan Commission presented its report on February 7th 1983 and concluded that Israel bore indirect responsibility for the massacre.  The report singled out Defence Minister Sharon and recommended his removal, suggesting he was unfit to hold public office.  On February 14th 1983 Ariel Sharon was sacked from his position.

The Israeli invasion killed over 18,000 people and injured over 30,000.  Although the Israeli army withdrew from Beirut it continued to occupy a ‘security zone’ in south Lebanon until May 2000.  The Israeli invasion failed in its mission to destroy the PLO and also failed to pacify the increasing restlessness of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.  In fact, the success of the Lebanese resistance and in particular the success of the Hizbullah against the occupation of the 'security zone would later inspire the Palestinians to embark on their own resistance.

The First Palestinian Intifada

After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon the PLO no longer had a base bordering Israel.   Even worse, the post-Lebanon dispersal meant that it was difficult to control the various factions.  Although Arafat set up his official headquarters in Tunis and insisted on continuing the diplomatic strategy, some of the rejectionist elements embarked on a series of international terrorist acts.  This undermined Arafat’s diplomatic efforts and by 1987 the PLO had failed to make concrete gains or to gain inclusion in what passed for a peace process.  The political paralysis of consecutive coalition governments in Israel led to despair that there would ever be an end to the occupation, a fear deepened by the failure of superpower efforts to resolve the situation and growing evidence of US partiality towards Israel.  To complete the picture, the Arab states placed the issue of Palestine as last item on the agenda at the 1987 Arab League Summit.

Meanwhile in the Occupied Territories important changes had occurred in Palestinian society. The failure of the PLO to make concrete gains was fuelling a sense that they needed to take affairs into their own hands. The move to a largely urban society, the growth of third level education, the rise of not just a new and more activist leadership but of a generation of radical, unafraid youth provided the masses necessary for such an undertaking.  Throughout the 1980's grassroots committees appeared encompassing nearly all fields and the Palestinians moved towards self-sustainability in an effort to break from the stranglehold of the occupation. These grassroots movements, particularly those based on women and youth, would later provide the structures upon which the intifada could operate. By the late 80's The failure of any international movement to secure peace and the increasingly oppressive nature of the occupation combined to create a powder keg of Palestinian frustration ready to explode.

On December 9th 1987, in what was perceived to be deliberate action, four Gazans were killed when a truck, driven by the brother of an Israeli recently killed in Gaza, went out of control.  The funerals sparked spontaneous rioting which spread across Gaza, then into the West Bank and resulted in the Intifada, the 'shaking off' of the occupation.  When the riots and demonstrations continued a local leadership emerged, the United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), which began to plan and coordinate the Intifada through a series of communiqués.  The leadership was composed of representatives of all the main PLO factions and the emerging Islamic movements. 

The short-term effect of the Intifada were to inoculate a new sense of pride and self-reliance in the Palestinians, unification of the PLO factions was achieved and a new solidarity developed with Palestinians across the green line in Israel proper. The uprising also marked the culmination of the shift of gravity of Palestinian politics to the Occupied Territories. 

Although initially caught by surprise by the spontaneity of the Intifada, the PLO quickly regained a position of influence.  The Intifada had resurrected the issue of Palestine in the eyes of the world and Arafat was quick to reassert control on the proceedings.  The success of the first year of the Intifada led directly to the declaration of a State of Palestine by Arafat on November 15th 1988.  In the Declaration of Independence Arafat publicly endorsed the two-state solution, recognised Israel, accepted UN resolution 242 and renounced terrorism.  Within days 30 nations recognised the PLO as the government in exile of the State of Palestine.  Israel denounced the declaration as irrelevant. 

The impact of the Intifada on Israel was significant in different ways.  It completely polarised Israeli society and for the first time forced many Israelis to face up to the moral implications of being an occupying country.  Images of one of the best-equipped armies in the world brutally suppressing an unarmed population were seen on television screens across the world.  The subsequent criticism of Israel, even by fellow Jews, pricked the pride and conscience of ordinary Israelis.  The Intifada also hit the fragile Israeli economy, with the occupation transformed from an overall asset into a liability with a total cost to the Israeli economy of $900 million in 1988.

As the Intifada continued so too did the repression.  By 1991 over one thousand Palestinians had been killed (50% under the age of 16), over 100,000 were injured and some 15,000 were detained without trial for periods of at least six months. 

The declaration of the state of Palestine marked the high point of the Intifada but shortly afterwards international interest was diverted elsewhere to the fall of the USSR and later the Gulf war.   With Israel managing to cope with the military and financial cost of the Intifada Palestinians began to lose heart and it gradually declined into internecine conflict.

The Start of the Peace Process

The Gulf War in 1991 was a defining moment in the conflict with the position of both Israel and the PLO undermined by the events of the war.  The comparisons between US and Arab states response to the occupations of Kuwait and Palestine were uncomfortable and in the aftermath the US realised that ultimately there could be no regional peace until the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had been resolved. To this end a peace conference was called in Madrid in 1991.

The fact that so many Arab states had joined the US coalition not only undermined Israel’s position as a US ally but showed that Israel could be a strategic liability.  Israel, reluctantly, agreed to attend but concurrently instigated a huge settlement-building program to create ‘facts on the ground’.

Saddam Hussein had been a great supporter of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and they considered him the only Arab leader capable of standing up to Israel and the West.  His promise to withdraw from Kuwait if Israel withdrew from Palestine and his promise to attack Israel if attacked himself made him overwhelmingly popular with the Palestinians.  Under considerable pressure from his constituents, Arafat choose to support Iraq.  This decision was a huge blunder and showed a failure to evaluate the moral and strategic implications.  Kuwait expelled all Palestinians living there and the Arab coalition members immediately cut off their funding leading to the near bankruptcy of the PLO.  With this background, the PLO had no choice but to accept the invitation to attend as part of the Jordanian delegation.

Oslo 1993

While the Madrid process failed in the spring and summer of 1993 secret negotiations were held between members of the Israeli government and the PLO in Oslo, Norway.

For the PLO these talks were crucial, they were bankrupt, lacking support in the Arab world and conscious that world attention was slipping away to the new conflict in Yugoslavia.  With the US firmly behind Israel, their failure to make any gains from their armed struggle, their diplomatic campaigns, the Intifada and now Madrid left them with no real alternative but to talk, albeit from a position of grave weakness.

The Israelis had also come to the conclusion that they had to resolve the conflict with the Palestinians.  The Intifada had damaged Israel’s reputation and was now spilling into Israeli cities.  Realistically the Israelis had only three options; seal off the Occupied Territories and retain the status quo, annex the Occupied Territories thereby undermining the Jewish nature of the state by increasing the Arab population., or make peace with the Palestinians.  The fact that Israel already held the Occupied Territories and could retain the status quo if they choose to meant that they started from a vastly superior position.

The Declaration of Principles

This was a framework in which Palestinian self-government was to be gradually extended over a defined area of the Occupied Territories over a period of five years followed by ‘final status’ talks which would resolve the more difficult issues of the conflict including the status of Jerusalem, the illegal Israeli settlements, definition of borders, the refugees and final security arrangements.

The process of turning various functions over to the Palestinian national Authority (PNA), to be elected in 1996, began in Jericho and Gaza and was later extended to mot of the urban sites of Palestinian population.  Three levels of autonomy existed; Area A where the PNA had full municipal control including internal security and public order, Area B where the PNA controlled civil matters and public order but Israel kept control of internal security and Area C where Israel kept control of internal security and public order.

The framework was never fully implemented, despite a series of later agreements such as the Cairo Agreement in May 1994, Oslo II in 1995 and the Wye Agreement in 1998, all designed to move the process further.  The total amount of territory returned was approximately 35% if which just 50% was Area A.  that meant that 50 years after the partition of Palestine, the Palestinians had autonomous control over less than four per cent of historic Palestine.

The Failures of Oslo

There were numerous reasons why Oslo failed.  The imbalance of power inherent in Oslo and its use of ‘constructive ambiguity’ caused problems throughout the process.  Whereas Israel realised most of its cherished ambitions at the beginning of the process, PLO recognition of Israel’s ‘right to exist’ in 78 per cent of historic Palestine and a Palestinian cessation of violence, the Palestinians were forced to wait until the final status negotiations to realise theirs.  This meant that the Palestinians had already made their ‘painful concessions’ and had used their main leverage for negotiations, placing their trust in the Israeli capacity to make equally painful concessions.

The PLO entered the peace process believing that the end result would be an independent State of Palestine based on UN Resolution 242 and a just resolution to the refugee problem.  It soon became apparent that the Israeli government believed it could be an ideal way to annex large swathes of territory without having to take responsibility for a hostile population.

The period following the signing of the Oslo Accords witnessed the greatest rise of illegal Israeli settlement building with the Jewish population of the Occupied Territories more than doubling over the next few years.  This move was completely inconsistent with the supposed search for peace and undermined Palestinian trust from the start.

The government of Israel seemed to be incapable of ending the repression and creating an environment for peace.  Unlike other peace processes, the much-anticipated release of Palestinian political prisoners failed to materialise.  Israel retained control of travel permits and forced Palestinians to apply days in advance if they wished to travel from one area to another.   A policy of closure of the territories in response to attacks led to large -scale unemployment with thousands unable to travel to their jobs in Israel.  Large-scale projects aimed at creating jobs and kick- starting the fledgling Palestinian economy were continually blocked by Israel.  The Palestinians were unable to build a port at Gaza, as the Israelis would not allow them to import concrete.  Likewise, when the Palestinians built the Gaza International Airport it was left inoperable for months by the Israeli refusal to allow the import of radar – an integral part of air traffic control.  These measures and many more served to infuriate the Palestinians who became increasingly more disillusioned with the process. 

The Rise of Hamas

Hamas, meaning "zeal" in Arabic, is an acronym for the Islamic resistance movement.  Hamas is believed to be an off-shoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and, according to legend, was founded on the eve of the Intifada by Sheikh Yassin.  Like many Islamic societies, as well as having a religious basis, Hamas has a political and social wing and offers many services including education, medical and social services.  However, Hamas is more famous in the West for its military wing, the al-Qassam brigades.

During the first Intifada, Hamas steadily grew in popularity due to its daring military operations and the provision of services to the poor and needy, particularly in the Gaza Strip.  At first, the Israeli government choose not only to turn a blind eye to the atrocities of Hamas but to encourage its emergence as an Islamic counterbalance to the nationalist al-Fatah.  In doing this, Israel hoped that in the future Hamas would be in a position to challenge al-Fatah and that the Palestinian resistance to Israel would descend into an internecine struggle. 

On February 26th 1994 an armed Jewish settler passed through a number of Israeli army checkpoints and entered the al-Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron whereupon he massacred 29 Palestinians praying.  Intense Palestinian rioting ensued and after a period of mourning Hamas launched a series of devastating bus bombings.  In doing so, Hamas took the lead of the Lebanese Hizbullah and introduced suicide bombings to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Camp David and the al-Aqsa Intifada

With the 1999 deadline for a final status agreement fast approaching and the right wing, anti-Oslo government of Binyamin Netanyahu in place the peace process had stalled and was in danger of collapsing.

The election of Ehud Barak as Israeli Prime Minister in January 1999, on a platform of pursuing a final status agreement with the Palestinians, seemed to offer the Oslo process a unique opportunity.  Arafat had been elected Palestinian President three years earlier and still had overwhelming support among Palestinians.  Beyond that, the main mediator, the US, had a second term president, Bill Clinton, who had developed a personal commitment to achieving Middle East peace.   With no need to worry about re -election and therefore freer to resist pressure from the 'Jewish lobby' an opportunity for a more impartial approach to the conflict seemed a real possibility.  At that crucial moment, however, Barak stepped back from negotiations in order to unsuccessfully pursue a treaty with Syria.  By the time he returned to the Palestinian issue in spring 2000, Clinton was near the end of his term and no longer had the clout he had had a year earlier.

Camp David

The hastily convened last-ditch effort at Camp David in July 2000 proved a complete failure.  Neither government had successfully laid the groundwork for potential concessions among their populations and the gap between their positions was still too great. 

After two weeks the talks collapsed amidst widespread recrimination.  Arafat had been reticent about attending in the first place, believing that what would be offered would fall short of the minimum Palestinian expectations.  It was only after intense pressure from Clinton, and the promise that he would not be blamed, that he agreed to attend.

There has also been huge debate about Baraks so-called ‘most genereous offer ever’ and Arafat’s subsequent rejection.  Reports vary about the extent of the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank but nearly all agree that Jerusalem would remain under Israeli control, the Palestinians would have no control over their borders or airspace, there would be no territorial contiguity to the new state and no right of return to the now nearly five million refugees.  Obviously this was an offer Arafat could not accept.   The Americans and Israelis immediately blamed Arafat for the failure of the negotiations. What followed was the demonisation of Arafat and the subsequent outbreak of the second Palestinian Intifada.

The Demonisation of Arafat

Following the collapse of the Camp David talks the international media was flooded with reports of how Barak had offered to withdraw from nearly all of the Occupied Territories and that Arafat had refused the deal.  An Israeli narrative developed which emphasised how maximally generous the offer had been and claimed that the only explanation for Arafat’s rejection was that he was still intent on reclaiming all of Palestine and therefore the destruction of Israel.  With Barak and Clinton’s Democratic party both facing elections, Clinton went back on his promise and spoke openly of Arafat’s ‘betrayal’.

Worse still, with the outbreak of the Intifada, the ‘long hand’ of Arafat was blamed once more.  Arafat, who had been championing the diplomatic struggle over the military struggle since the 1970’s, who had won the Nobel Peace Prize for being an instigator of the Oslo Accords, who had made the ‘painful concession’ of recognizing Israel and giving up 78 per cent of historic Palestine was now being portrayed as a bloodthirsty terrorist.  Previously proclaimed a ' partner for peace' and welcome in the homes of Israeli politicians suddenly, now that he was refusing to make further concessions, Arafat was once again persona non grata.  He was blamed by Israel for every attack.  Following a series of Hamas-sponsored suicide bombings, the Israeli army destroyed much of Arafat’s presidential complex and placed him under a humiliating siege claiming that he was now irrelevant.

The final insult came when the new US President George W. Bush, praised the man Palestinians hold responsible for numerous massacres and who many believe provoked the Intifada, Ariel Sharon, as a “man of peace”.  He then proceeded to tell the Palestinians that if they wanted a state they needed to dump the man who had lead them selflessly for over thirty years and elect a new leader.

Arafat had refused to play ball and was now being frozen out.

The al-Aqsa Intifada

Palestinian and Arab media reported a very different picture of the Camp David talks.  It became apparent that Barak’s ‘generous offer’ was not only an insult but also a cause for concern.  The Israelis were intent on keeping all of Jerusalem and therefore the Haram al –Sharif, the noble sanctuary, containing the al-Aqsa mosque, the third holiest site in Islam.  Throughout the process the continual closure of the Occupied Territories by Israel had prevented many Palestinians from praying at al-Aqsa and the thought of losing the site forever had instilled a great sense of urgency among Palestinians.

On September 28th, 2000 Ariel Sharon, escorted by nearly 2,000 soldiers made a provocative visit to the Haram al-Sharif, in an effort to prove Israeli sovereignty over the site.  The visit initiated a wave of violence that spread across the Occupied Territories and into Israel proper.  The disproportionate Israeli response, during which dozens of unarmed protestors were killed, ensured the violence would escalate into a sustained intifada.

The al-Aqsa Intifada was markedly different to the first Intifada.  During the first uprising the Palestinians pursued civil disobedience and non-violent demonstrations in a rebellion against the occupation.  The al-Aqsa Intifada was seen as a war of liberation and with the proliferation of arms in the Occupied Territories, it soon became an armed struggle.

Both sides committed atrocities as the violence spiralled out of control.  Diplomatic initiatives tried to restart negotiations.  In January 2001, in Taba, Egypt, Barak sent the highest level negotiating team in Israel’s history to talks that came tantalisingly close to a breakthrough.  However realising that he was on the verge of electoral defeat, Barak backtracked at the last moment and the negotiations were left unfinished.  Senator George Mitchell, in May 2002, and Director of CIA George Tenet, in June 2001, both created plans to stop the violence but were both unsuccessful.  With the election of Ariel Sharon direct talks ended.

Perhaps the most promising peace plan came from Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia.  The Saudi peace plan, which was approved by the Arab League in March 2002, proposed that in exchange for a full Israeli withdrawal from all Occupied Territories, Arab nations would not only recognise Israel but hold ‘normal’ relations.  The plan also went on to call for a ‘just’ resolution to the refugee problem instead of the ‘right to return’, a subtle but huge difference.  This plan was an historic opportunity for Israel to achieve its goals of living in peace and security.  Furthermore, normalised relations would give Israel an opportunity to become an important regional player.  The Israeli response was to launch a devastating invasion of most of the West Bank cities, killing hundreds and imprisoning thousands of Palestinians.

The re-occupation of Palestine led to the destruction of all symbols of Palestinian governance.  Government offices were destroyed or trashed, electricity and water supplies disrupted and hundreds of homes demolished, Crucially the security infrastructure was comprehensively destroyed ensuring the PA could not respond to Israeli demands to 'clamp down on the terrorists'.    Daily life of ordinary Palestinians was totally disrupted with the borders between Israel and the Occupied Territories closed and the territories themselves carved them up into over 200 separate entities, with debilitating roadblocks between them.  The Palestinian economy was destroyed with unemployment at a record high and the majority of the Palestinian population now dependent on UN and other aid organisations for food. 

The Intifada settled into a predictable pattern.  Hamas would launch an attack against Israel, Israel would blame Arafat and then attack the PNA or Palestinian police force.  Hamas, being in direct competition with PNA, would find their popularity increased by their capacity to fight. The PNA would become weakened by both the success of Hamas and their failure to repel Israeli attacks.  If the Palestinian police clamped down on the activities of the militia, they would be accused of doing the Israeli’s dirty work. 

Furthermore, after every instance when the Palestinians declared a temporary truce or cessation of violence the Israelis would assassinate a leading militant and the violence would start up all over again.  The most indicative example of this was two hours before Hamas and other organisations were about to sign an EU-brokered truce, Israel assassinated a founding member of Hamas.  Using an F-15 warplane, Israel dropped a one-tonne bomb on a crowded neighbourhood, killing Salah Shehada and 17 civilians, including 11 children.  It was to be another year, and hundreds more deaths, before Hamas were ready to sit down and talk about another cease-fire.

By the time the Palestinian factions did declare a cease-fire on July 1st 2003, over 2,400 Palestinians and 600 Israelis had been killed.  Palestinian injuries were in the tens of thousands with approximately twenty per cent permanently disabled.  Over 7,000 Palestinian political prisoners were languishing in jail.

The 'Road Map' to Peace

On June 4th, 2003 Israeli Prime Minister Sharon and new Palestinian Prime Minister Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas), met in Aqaba, Jordan, and announced their acceptance of President Bush’s ‘road map’ for peace.  This plan incorporated elements of the Mitchell, Tenet and Saudi plans and calls for a Palestinian state to be created by the end of 2005.

The first stage of the plan calls for an end to violence on both sides, Palestinian reforms and elections, an Israeli settlement freeze and an Israeli withdrawal to pre-Intifada 2000 positions. 

It is too early to say whether the ‘road map’ will succeed but so far the signs are not promising.  Once more, the Palestinians have been forced to carry out their obligations at the beginning of the process.  They have carried out widespread economic and political reforms and all the main factions have announced a truce.  Israel, on the other hand, is continuing to expropriate land to ‘thicken’ settlements and to build a so-called ‘security’ fence deep inside Palestinian territory.  The Israeli government is still pursuing a policy of placing further demands on Palestinians before fulfilling their obligations.  Without increased pressure by an outside mediator the peace process, which is months behind schedule, will run out of good will.

With the more complicated issues of Jerusalem, the refugees, the settlements, the final borders and the nature of a Palestinian state still to be negotiated, the need to foster a spirit for peace is of the utmost importance.  The Palestinians have had decades of hollow words and empty promises, they have watched while their land has been stolen, they have watched while their territory has shrunk, they have spent generations as refugees and they have lived and died in repression.  The world forgot about the lives of the nearly five million Palestinian refugees a long time ago.  The world forgot about the 1948 Partition Plan and forgot about the 1949 Armistice Line. The world looked away when UN resolutions and Geneva conventions were ignored, the world continues to look away as human rights are neglected. 

Peace will only be achieved when Palestinians are granted the same human rights as other humans.  Peace will only be achieved when the Israelis are forced to respect international law and abide by international treaties.  Peace will only be achieved when the Palestinians are given back their dignity, their land and a state of their own on the last remaining part of Palestine. 

History has proven that fencing a nation of people into ghettos and treating them in a subhuman way does not bring about peace.  It is time for the world to learn from history.

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